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Lifting the Veil: 
 An Analysis of Pre-Trade Transparency at the NYSE 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates an important feature of market design: pre-trade transparency, 
defined as the availability of information about pending trading interest in the market. We 
look at how the NYSE's introduction of OpenBook, which enables traders off the exchange 
floor to observe depth in the limit order book in real time, affects the trading strategies of 
investors and specialists, informational efficiency, liquidity, and returns. We find that traders 
attempt to manage the exposure of their limit orders: the cancellation rate of limit orders 
increases, time-to-cancellation of limit orders shortens, and smaller limit orders are 
submitted. The new information OpenBook provides seems to cause traders to prefer 
managing the trading process themselves, rather than delegating this task to floor brokers. 
We also show that specialists' participation rate in trading decreases and the depth they add to 
the quote goes down, consistent with a loss of their informational advantage or with being 
"crowded out" by active limit order strategies. We detect an improvement in the 
informational efficiency of prices after the introduction of OpenBook. Greater pre-trade 
transparency leads to some improvement in displayed liquidity in the book and a reduction in 
the execution costs of trades. We find that cumulative abnormal returns are positive and 
significant after the introduction of OpenBook, consistent with the view that improvement in 
liquidity affects stock returns. 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of new exchanges and trading platforms in the U.S. and abroad brings to 
the forefront many issues in market design. Should a market have at its core an electronic limit 
order book? What possible role can market makers play? What information should market 
participants observe on order flow and prices? These issues have implications for the trading 
strategies employed by investors, the behavior of specialists, liquidity in the market, the 
informational efficiency of prices, and ultimately the valuations of listed companies and the 
welfare of their shareholders. In this work we investigate a key feature of market design: 
transparency, defined as the ability of market participants to observe the information in the trading 
process.  
Our focus is on a particular form of transparency: the ability of market participants to 
observe the pending trading interests of other participants, or in other words, the content of the 
limit order book. Knowledge about buying and selling interest can be used both to refine one's 
inference about the value of a security, and to strategically plan the execution of a trading goal to 
minimize transaction costs. We use a natural experiment, the introduction of OpenBook by the 
NYSE, to investigate the impact of an exogenous increase in the level of pub lic information about 
the content of the limit order book.  
OpenBook, introduced in January 2002, allows traders off the NYSE floor to observe the 
depth in the book in real time at each price level for all securities. Before the introduction of 
OpenBook, only the best bid and offer that can represent both the limit order book and the 
specialist's own trading interest were disseminated by the NYSE. Our objective in this study is to 
examine how publicly revealing information about the limit order book affects the trading 
strategies investors employ, the manner in which prices evolve in response to order flow, the 
resulting state of liquidity in the market, and cumulative abnormal returns around the event.  
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Previous research on transparency made a distinction between pre-trade transparency, or 
the availability of information about quotes and trading interest, and post-trade transparency, 
which describes information about executed trades.1 Even in the realm of pre-trade transparency, 
which is our subject of investigation, most papers looked at the influence of quote information in a 
multiple-dealer market (e.g., Bloomfield and O'Hara, 1999; Flood, et al., 1999) or used the 
availability of information to characterize different market structures (e.g., Madhavan, 1992; Biais, 
1993; Pagano and Röell, 1996).2 Since, in general, detailed theoretical modeling of the interaction 
in a limit order book environment is a difficult task, there has been less research on the question of 
how much of the content of a limit order book should be revealed.  
In organizing our empirical investigation, we have found it useful to think about the 
consequences of changes in pre-trade transparency in terms of direct effects on the trading 
strategies of market participants, the resulting equilibrium effects on the market in terms of 
informational efficiency and liquidity, and the potential welfare implications. Trading strategies of 
investors and market professionals, such as the use of limit orders, can differ substantially 
depending on whether the book is open or closed. This, in turn, affects both the adjustment of 
prices to new information and aggregate liquidity provision in the market (or the trading costs of 
investors). A change in liquidity can then result in stock prices adjusting to reflect the effects of 
future transactions costs on expected returns.  
Harris (1996) provides a discussion of the risks associated with the exposure of limit 
orders. The first risk is that a trader may reveal to the market private information about the value of 
the security, allowing other traders to trade on it. A second risk is that exposed limit orders can be 
                                                                 
1 For papers that investigate post-trade transparency see Chowhdry and Nanda (1991), Naik, Neuberger, and 
Viswanathan (1994), Franks and Schaefer (1995), Madhavan (1995), Lyons (1996), and Bloomfield and O'Hara 
(1999). 
2 Madhavan (1996) investigates the role of information about order flow, but focuses on the availability of information 
about traders' motives (i.e., whether liquidity traders can be identified) and therefore can be viewed more as a model of 
anonymity in financial markets. See also Rindi (2002). 
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used to construct trading strategies aimed explicitly at taking advantage of these limit orders (e.g., 
"pennying" or front-running the limit orders). Harris mentions strategies that limit-order traders 
can use to manage the exposure of their orders. Traders may break up their orders, submitting 
smaller limit orders. This would reduce the first risk, as market observers may be more reluctant to 
make an inference about the value of the security based on a small order. Traders may also 
increase the frequency at which they cancel and resubmit limit orders. This would reduce the 
second risk, as it would frustrate front-running strategies. Finally, traders may use agents closer to 
the trading process (floor brokers at the NYSE) to manage order exposure, rather than submitting 
limit orders to the book themselves.  
We empirically look at the cancellation of limit orders after OpenBook is introduced, and 
find that the cancellation rate of limit orders increases and time-to-cancellation of limit orders in 
the book is shorter. We also find that the size of limit orders submitted after the change in 
transparency is smaller. Hence, we provide evidence that traders attempt to manage the exposure 
of their orders, in line with Harris' reasoning. However, we do not observe a shift from trading 
using limit orders in the book to trading with the help of floor brokers. In contrast, the volume 
executed by floor brokers declines relative to that executed against limit orders in the book. The 
new ability to see depth in the book may create a “visibility effect,” where traders observe 
information about demand and supply away from the quote and can see how their actions affect the 
market. This visibility effect may make self-management of orders more appealing to traders, 
analogously to the attraction of active traders in Nasdaq stocks to electronic communications 
networks. Such an effect may in fact dominate the argument made by Harris (1996) for employing 
agents, and explain our results. 
We also investigate the trading of one particular type of market professionals—NYSE 
specialists—who are both in charge of maintaining the limit order book and trade for their own 
account (i.e., make a market in the stocks). An open limit order book may affect specialists in a 
couple of ways. First, if investors become reluctant to provide liquidity with limit orders, 
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specialists may need to step up their participation in the trading process in their capacity as 
liquidity providers of last resort. Second, the opening of the book may reduce the informational 
advantage specialists have about future price movements.3 This may make proprietary trading 
riskier for the specialists, reducing their incentive to trade.  
We find that the specialist participation rate in trades decreases following the introduction 
of OpenBook. We also find that they reduce the depth they add (together with floor brokers) to the 
quote beyond what is in the limit order book. These changes in trading strategies are consistent 
with an increase in the risk of proprietary trading on the part of specialists due to the loss of their 
informational advantage. Because public limit orders have priority over the specialists' proprietary 
trading, these changes are also consistent with a "crowding out" effect due to more active limit 
order strategies employed by investors. Finally, the smaller contribution of the floor to the quoted 
depth may be due to the shift we observe from floor trades to limit orders that are sent to the book 
electronically. 
The changing strategies of market participants can bring about changes to characteristics of 
the market environment about which investors care, such as liquidity and informational efficiency. 
Several arguments have been made in the literature about the impact of pre-trade transparency on 
these market characteristics. Glosten (1999) presents an informal argument stating that increased 
transparency should lead to greater commonality of information, and that this tends to reduce the 
extent of adverse selection. His argument implies that greater transparency should result in more 
efficient prices (information is coming out faster) and smaller spreads (less need to protect against 
informed traders). Baruch (2002) examines the question of who benefits from an open limit order 
book in a static model where market orders are submitted by liquidity traders and a strategic 
informed trader, while liquidity is supplied by limit order traders and a specialist. Two 
                                                                 
3 On the issue of whether the limit order book contains information about future price movements see Harris and 
Panchapagesan (1999), Irvine, Benston, and Kandel (2000), Kaniel and Liu (2001), and Coppejans and Domowitz 
(2002). 
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implications that come out of his model are that opening the book (i) improves liquidity in the 
sense that the price impact of market orders is smaller, and (ii) improves the informational 
efficiency of prices. Therefore, both Glosten and Baruch claim that greater transparency is a "win-
win" situation.  
A different view is expressed by Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2000). They present a 
static model with multiple informed and uninformed traders who use market orders, and liquidity 
traders who use limit orders. In their model, greater transparency leads to higher spreads, smaller 
depth, and higher volatility. Therefore, opening the book reduces liquidity, in contrast to the 
predictions of Baruch (2002) and Glosten (1999). Madhavan et al. also conduct an empirical 
investigation of the decision by the Toronto Stock Exchange to publicly disseminate information 
about depth at the top four price levels in the book (in addition to the best bid and offer) in April of 
1990. Since they do not have the detailed order- level data that we have here, they are unable to 
provide evidence about investor strategies or depth in the book. They do show, however, that 
spreads are wider after the event and that volatility is higher, both consistent with their theoretical 
predictions.4 
Our results contrast with the Toronto Stock Exchange findings and provide support for the 
view that greater pre-trade transparency is a "win-win" situation. We examine whether greater pre-
trade transparency indeed improves the commonality of information and makes prices more 
efficient. We use a variance decomposition methodology proposed by Hasbrouck (1993) to 
measure the deviations of transaction prices from the efficient (random walk) price. We find a 
decrease in the magnitude of the price deviations. We also document a slight decrease in the 
absolute value of first-order return autocorrelations calculated from quote midpoints. These 
                                                                 
4 While there are no other empirical papers investigating limit order book transparency, two experimental 
investigations touch upon the issue. Friedman (1993) finds that showing the entire book (as opposed to only the best 
bid and offer) decreases the bid-ask spread in the market, but does not significantly alter the informational efficiency 
of prices. Gerke, Arneth, Bosch, and Syha (1997) compare open and closed book environments and find lower 
volatility in the transparent setting but no statistically significant differences in spreads. 
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findings are consistent with more efficient prices following the introduction of OpenBook that are 
less subject to overshooting and reversal. We examine Glosten’s prediction regarding the effect of 
transparency on adverse selection using a different vector autoregression procedure (Hasbrouck, 
1991), which enables us to estimate the normalized trade-correlated component of the efficient 
price variance. We find weak evidence of a decrease in the trade-correlated component, consistent 
with a reduction in the information content of trades. 
We then examine two measures of the state of liquidity in the market: depth in the book 
and effective spreads. We find that displayed liquidity in the limit order book increases somewhat 
following the introduction of OpenBook. Results on effective spreads confirm that execution costs 
decline. Our analysis of the changes in liquidity around the event uses several econometric models 
in order to implement controls and account for potential estimation problems. Our results are 
robust to the different methodologies we employ.  
We proceed to examine whether the change in market design influenced returns around the 
event. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) claim that liquidity affects expected returns in that investors 
require higher expected returns to compensate them for higher transactions costs. Since we 
document an improvement in effective spreads, a natural hypothesis is that prices increase to 
reflect lower future expected returns. Indeed, we provide evidence that cumulative abnormal 
returns are positive following the introduction of OpenBook. We also show that abnormal returns 
are negatively related to transactions costs (in the form of effective spreads) around the event, 
which is consistent with our interpretation of the price effects of the event resulting from the 
improved liquidity.  
Overall, we find that greater transparency of the limit order book benefits investors. This 
finding is important for several reasons. First, the theoretical literature provides conflicting 
predictions on how liquidity would change when opening the book. Furthermore, our findings 
about liquidity contrast with those that were documented when the Toronto Stock Exchange started 
revealing information about demand in the book. Second, the Securities and Exchange 
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Commission (SEC) has repeatedly emphasized the need for increased pre-trade transparency. Our 
paper is the first empirical examination to provide support for such a policy. Third, our results 
show that market design is important for both the welfare of investors and the informational 
efficiency of prices. As such, research on market design can help exchanges and regulators in the 
direction of improving the functioning of financial markets.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides details on the OpenBook 
initiative at the NYSE, describes the methodology, and presents the sample and the data sources 
used in the investigation. Section 3 presents the results of our tests concerning the trading 
strategies of investors, the participation of specialists, informational efficiency, liquidity, and 
returns. Section 4 is a conclusion. 
2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.1 OpenBook 
Whether or not to make public the content of the limit order book maintained by specialists 
at the NYSE has been the subject of continuous discussion for over a decade. In 1991, the NYSE 
received the approval of the SEC for a program that would have provided snapshots of the book to 
member firms three times a day. In June of that year, the NYSE announced that it would not 
implement the system, citing lack of interest among member firms. In 1998, the NYSE announced 
that it considers providing information about the limit order book for prices that are two ticks 
below and above the best bid and offer. In 2001, the NYSE filed with the SEC to provide a service 
called OpenBook that gives information about depth in the book to subscribers, either directly 
from the NYSE or through data vendors such as Reuters and Bloomberg.  
The NYSE's request was approved by the SEC on December 7, 2001, and the OpenBook 
service was introduced on January 24, 2002 for all NYSE securities simultaneously. The 
OpenBook service operates between 7:30am and 4:30pm. It is available for all NYSE-traded 
securities and shows the aggregate limit order volume available in the NYSE Display Book system 
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at each price point. The information about depth is updated every 10 seconds throughout the day. 
Since the NYSE charges money for the service, it is possible to have a sense of the extent to which 
this new information is being disseminated. OpenBook had approximately 2,700 subscribers when 
the service was introduced. This number grew to about 6,000 during the first four months of 
operation in a rather linear fashion. 
2.2 Methodology 
We are interested in identifying the permanent effects of the change in pre-trade 
transparency associated with the introduction of OpenBook. As such, we need to examine two 
periods in which the market is in equilibrium with respect to traders' use of order flow information, 
one before the event and one after the event. For the length of each period we choose two weeks 
(10 trading days). We believe that this choice strikes a balance between our desire to employ more 
data for the statistical tests on the one hand, and both the stability of the estimates and the 
complexity of handling NYSE order- level data on the other.  
While the introduction of OpenBook is an anticipated event, altering trading strategies in 
response to limit order book data can only be done after the data becomes available on January 24. 
Therefore, there is no need to eliminate a long window before the event in order to get the steady 
state of the traders' strategy. Since January 24 is a Thursday, we choose the full two trading weeks 
prior to the introduction week as the pre-event period (January 7 through January 18). 
The choice of an appropriate post-event period is more complex. While traders are able to 
see limit order book information beginning January 24, learning how to use this information may 
take time. This is true both for traders who just want to use it to optimize the execution of their 
orders and for traders who plan to use it to design profitable trading strategies. Furthermore, once 
such strategies are in place, other traders (e.g., mutual funds' trading desks) may see the execution 
quality of their limit orders deteriorating. This would prompt more traders to change their 
strategies until a new equilibrium emerges. How long it takes for such a process is hard to say. It 
 9
can take days, weeks, or months, depending on the sophistication of the traders and profit 
opportunities. Furthermore, the number of subscribers increased in the months following the 
introduction of OpenBook, which could also have affected the adjustment of the market to the new 
pre-transparency regime. 
One approach to choosing a post-event equilibrium period is therefore to take a period that 
is rather far from the event itself. While this may be useful in assuring that the changes are 
permanent, it becomes more difficult to attribute them to the event the more time has passed. 
Another approach is to choose a rather lengthy post-event period. This has the disadvantage that 
the variables of interest may not be stationary during the period of adjustment. Also, different error 
structures in pre- and post-event periods due to different lengths would complicate the statistical 
testing.  
We therefore choose a third approach that we hope overcomes these problems. We use two 
weeks as the length of a post-event period to have a similar error structure for the pre- and post-
event periods. This also enables us to capture "snapshots" of the trading environment that are not 
too contaminated by non-stationarity. However, to allow for an adjustment to an equilibrium state, 
and to examine such an adjustment, we use four post-event periods rather than one. We take the 
first two full weeks of trading of each month following the introduction of OpenBook: February 4-
15, March 4-15, April 1-12, and May 6-17. This enables us to examine how the new equilibrium 
emerges over time.  
For each of the periods, we compute stock-specific means for all variables. We then report 
the median across stocks of pair-wise differences between each of the post-event periods and the 
pre-event period, and the p-value from a Wilcoxon test for the two-sided hypothesis that the 
median is equal to zero. We believe that this approach is preferable to a more parametric 
multivariate analysis. An alternative approach is to regress the change in a variable (e.g., effective 
spreads) on a set of control variables (e.g., volume or volatility), and conduct tests on the intercept. 
There are several potential problems with such an approach. First, many of the variables we 
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investigate do not necessarily fit the distributional assumptions needed for parametric tests. 
Second, the relations among many of the variables under investigation and the controls are 
endogenous.5 Third, the nature of the relation (e.g., functional form) between the variables under 
investigation and the controls can change due to the new trading strategies of market participants 
who use OpenBook.6  
Because these problems may make it difficult to interpret the results, especially in a 
multiple-equation regression model, we prefer to focus on non-parametric tests of each variable 
separately. We will therefore investigate the total effects of the introduction of OpenBook, without 
making an attempt to disentangle which changes represent "direct" effects of the event and which 
changes are "indirect" effects attributable to changes in other variables. In light of the conflicting 
theoretical predictions with regard to the effects of pre-trade transparency on liquidity, however, 
we also perform a rather extensive set of robustness tests using various econometric models when 
analyzing effective spreads and book depth.  
2.3 Sample and Data 
The universe of stocks considered for this study includes all common stocks of domestic 
issuers traded on the NYSE. We eliminate firms that do not trade continuously between January 
and May of 2002, firms with more than one class of traded shares, closed-end funds, and 
investment trusts. This results in a population of 1,332 stocks, which are sorted by median dollar 
volume in the last quarter of 2001 and divided into four quartiles. From each quartile we choose a 
stratified sample of 100 securities. Our final sample, therefore, consists of 400 stocks that can be 
                                                                 
5 For example, volume can be influenced by trading costs (e.g., effective spreads) and hence a single-equation 
regression of spread changes on volume changes may be inappropriate. 
6 For example, it may be the case that the entire change in spreads can be attributed to changes in volume and 
volatility, but the functional relation changed and so the linear regression will show a significant intercept when it 
should not. Similarly, spreads may actually change due to new trading strategies beyond what can be attributed to 
volume and volatility, but the regression may yield an insignificant intercept. This situation can arise due to a change 
in the level of the right-hand-side variables in conjunction with a change in the relation among the variables. 
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divided into four groups according to the amount of trading activity in the stocks. In the 
presentation of our findings, if the picture is very similar across groups we present only the results 
for the entire sample to simplify the exposition. Whenever the results differ for stocks with 
different trading intensity, we present the results for the four groups separately. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the entire sample and for each of the four trading-
intensity groups. We present summary statistics for the pre-event period and the four post-event 
periods. The table testifies to the heterogeneous nature of the sample, ranging from a median 
average daily volume of 59.43 million dollars for the most actively traded group in the pre-event 
period to a median of $370,000 for the least actively traded group. All variables—volume, quoted 
spread, depth, effective spread, and price—change in the expected manner when moving from the 
most active stocks to the least active stocks. For the most (least) actively traded stocks, median 
quoted spread is 4.4 (8.9) cents and median quoted depth (summing both the bid and ask sides) is 
3,445 (1,607) shares. We also observe that prices are higher for the most actively traded stocks in 
the sample, $42.74, as compared with $11.15 for stocks in the least actively traded group.  
The data source used for the summary statistics in Table 1 is the TAQ database distributed 
by the New York Stock Exchange. We use these data to analyze effective spreads, intraday 
volatility, and informational efficiency. 7 To study the price effects of liquidity changes, we use 
daily distribution- and split-adjusted returns from FactSet.  
The rest of the analysis in the paper is based on NYSE order- level data contained in the 
System Order Data (SOD) and Consolidated Equity Audit Trail Data (CAUD) files. A reduced 
                                                                 
7 The variables we analyze are calculated using NYSE trades and quotes.  We apply various filters to clean the data. 
We only use trades for which TAQ's CORR field is equal to either zero or one, and for which the COND field is  either 
blank or equal to B, J, K, or S. We eliminate trades with non-positive prices. We also exclude a trade if its price is 
greater (less) than 150% (50%) of the price of the previous trade. We eliminate quotes for which TAQ's MODE field is 
equal to 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 27, 28, or 29. We exclude quotes with non-positive ask or bid 
prices, or where the bid is greater than the ask. We require that the difference between the bid and the ask be smaller 
than 25% of the quote midpoint. We also eliminate a quote if the bid or the ask satisfy the condition that they are 
greater (less) than 150% (50%) of the bid or ask of the previous quote. When signing trades, we employ yet an 
additional filter that requires the difference between the price and the prevailing quote-midpoint to be smaller than $8. 
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version of these files was the basis for the TORQ database organized by Joel Hasbrouck in 1991, 
and a description of the files can be found in Hasbrouck (1992). In general, the SOD file contains 
detailed information on all orders that arrive at the NYSE via the SuperDot system or are entered 
into the Display Book system (which powers the limit order book) by the specialist. It contains 
about 99% of the orders, representing 75% of NYSE volume, and follows the orders from arrival 
through execution or cancellation. Together with the LOFOPEN file that describes the exact state 
of the limit order book every day before the opening of trading, SOD allows us to precisely 
reconstruct the limit order book on the NYSE at any point in time. It also enables us to examine 
how investors change their order submission strategies, and to determine how much depth 
specialists and floor brokers add to the quote beyond what is in the limit order book.  
The CAUD files contain detailed execution information on both electronic and manual 
(those handled by floor brokers) orders. It enables us to determine the participation rate of 
specialists in the trading process, and the portions of trading volume that originate from either 
floor brokers or electronic limit orders.  
3 RESULTS 
Our analysis of the change in pre-trade transparency induced by OpenBook closely follows 
the exposition of the arguments in the introduction. First, we look at how market participants 
change their trading strategies as a result of the event. In this context we examine both the traders' 
use of limit orders and the specialists' participation in trading and liquidity provision. Second, we 
examine how these strategies affect the informational efficiency of prices by looking at the 
deviations of transaction prices from the efficient price and the autocorrelations of quote-midpoint 
returns. Third, we look at liquidity provision in the book and execution costs for NYSE trades. 
Finally, we study how the changes in liquidity affect returns.  
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3.1 Trading Strategies 
Harris (1996) conjectures that traders will react to the risk in order exposure by changing 
their behavior: canceling and resubmitting limit orders more frequently (shortening the time they 
are publicly displayed in the book), breaking down limit orders into smaller sizes, and making 
greater use of agents such as floor brokers.  
Table 2 examines the management of order exposure by traders using data from the SOD 
and CAUD files. The results are presented for the entire sample, because the four groups behave in 
a similar fashion. The first line of Panel A shows an increase in the cancellation rate of limit orders 
(number of limit orders cancelled divided by the number submitted). The median differences 
between the post- and pre-event periods are positive, and increase monotonically with time. The 
median change from January to February is 0.68%  (though not statistically significant), reaching 
4.75% between January and May (and highly statistically significant). The second line of Panel A 
presents the time-to-cancellation (in seconds) of limit orders that are cancelled. It decreases 
following the event, and the magnitude of the changes increases with time. Compared to January, 
time-to-cancellation in February is 12.77 seconds shorter, and 50.58 seconds shorter in the May 
post-event period. On a pre-event median value of 290 seconds, the decrease in time-to-
cancellation seems to be rather large (17.4%). 
A limitation of the above analysis of time-to-cancellation and the cancellation rate is that it 
ignores censoring (i.e., limit orders that are executed or expire and therefore cannot be cancelled). 
We therefore use survival (or duration) analysis to estimate two models that take censoring into 
account (see Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang, 2002; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2002). First, we use an 
accelerated failure time model where time-to-cancellation is assumed to follow a Weibull 
distribution. The logarithm of time-to-cancellation of limit orders is modeled as a linear function of 
an intercept, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 after the introduction of OpenBook, and the 
distance of the limit order from the relevant quote side (the bid for limit sell orders and the ask for 
limit buy orders) divided by the quote midpoint. The standardized distance from the quote is 
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included as a covariate since it presumably is an important determinant of the probability of both 
execution and cancellation. The duration model is estimated separately for each stock using all 
limit orders in the 20-day pre- and post-event periods. 
The first line in Panel B of Table 2 presents the cross-sectional median of the coefficients 
on the event dummy variable and the number of these coefficients that are statistically significant 
(in the 5% level). In all four post-event periods, the median of the coefficients is negative, the 
Wilcoxon test is highly significant, and over 394 (out of 400) of the coefficients in the individual 
stocks’ regressions are statistically significant. To interpret the coefficients, we apply the 
transformation ecoefficient-1 that provides the percentage change in time-to-cancellation between the 
pre- and post event periods. For the February post-event period, a median coefficient of –0.1106 
means that time-to-cancellation of limit orders decreased by 10.47%. By May, a median 
coefficient of –0.2782 means that time-to-cancellation decreased by 24.29%. 
We also report the results of semiparametric Cox regressions (see Cox, 1972), where the 
logarithm of the hazard rate is modeled as a linear function of an intercept, a dummy variable for 
the event, and the distance from the quote. While both the Cox model and the Weibull model 
belong to the class of proportional Hazard models, the Cox model does not require that we choose 
a particular probability distribution for time-to-cancellation. The second line of Panel B presents 
the cross-sectional median of the coefficients on the dummy variable and the number of significant 
coefficients. These coefficients can be interpreted as the ratio of the estimated cancellation rate of 
limit orders in the post-event period to the estimated cancellation rate in the pre-event period 
(controlling for the distance from the quote). The results indicate that the cancellation rate 
increases in a gradual manner: from 6.36% in February to 15.90% in May. The increase in 
cancellation rate is highly statistically significant in all four periods. 
Panel C of Table 2 continues our investigation of changes to the trading strategies of 
investors following the introduction of OpenBook. The first line shows median pair-wise 
differences in the size of limit orders between the post- and pre-event periods. For all four post-
 15
event periods, the median changes are negative and statistically different from zero. The magnitude 
of the changes seems to increase with time after the event. The difference in the size of a typical 
limit order of the same stock between February and January is -29.5 shares. This difference 
increases in magnitude to -68.4 in May. On a pre-event median limit order size of 543 shares, this 
represents a decrease of 12.6%. 
The second line in Panel C presents the changes in floor-broker activity relative to 
electronic limit-order activity. The ratio we compute is the sum of the number of shares bought and 
sold by floor brokers divided by the sum of the number of shares bought and sold by limit orders in 
the book. We document a decline in floor activity relative to limit orders in the book, ranging from 
-0.014 in February to -0.05 in May (with the differences in the last three post-event periods 
statistically different from zero).  
The results are consistent with heightened limit-order exposure management: smaller limit 
orders are submitted, limit orders are cancelled more often, and limit orders are left for a shorter 
time in the book. The new ability to see depth in the book seems to make self-management of the 
trading process more attractive. The shift we document from floor trading to electronic limit orders 
may indicate that the benefit associated with active trading strategies employed by the traders 
themselves using OpenBook outweighs the cost of displaying trading interests. The trend in 
median differences for the four post-event periods that we observe in the variables describing 
trading strategies is consistent with traders learning over time about the new service, learning how 
to use the information in OpenBook, and adjusting their trading strategies accordingly.8  
The change in pre-trade transparency and the change in the behavior of traders can cause 
NYSE specialists, who make a market in the stocks, to alter their behavior. We use the CAUD files 
to examine the specialists' participation rate in the trading process. The participation rate is defined 
                                                                 
8 The adjustment takes time because not all traders learn at the same speed, and also because predatory trading 
strategies based on the information in OpenBook take time to develop. Time may be further required for institutional 
traders to learn about the risks in leaving their limit orders on the book in the new environment. 
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as the number of shares bought and sold by the specialist over the total number of shares bought 
and sold. The first line in Panel D of Table 2 shows that the specialists' participation rate decrease 
in the post-event periods. While the median difference between the first post-event period and the 
pre-event period is not statistically distinguishable from zero, the median differences of the three 
other post-event periods are negative and highly statistically significant.9  
The second line in Panel D describes the dollar value that the specialists (potentially 
reflecting floor brokers’ trading interest) add to the quoted depth beyond what is in the limit order 
book. To create this variable, we use the LOFOPEN and SOD files to reconstruct the book and 
compare the best prices in the book to the quote disseminated by the exchange every five minutes 
throughout the trading day. Then we average the specialist’s contribution over all five-minute 
snapshots and compute the differences between the post- and pre-event periods for each stock. The 
specialists’ contribution decreases monotonically over the four post-event periods, from a median 
difference of -$1,164.76 to -$2,599.81 (with three out of the four differences statistically different 
from zero). 
These results—less participation by the specialists in trading and committing to a smaller 
quoted depth—are consistent with an increase in the risk associated with the specialists’ 
proprietary trading due the loss of their informational advantage. They are also consistent with a 
“crowding out” effect, where more active management of public limit orders (that have priority 
over the proprietary trading of specialists) is limiting the ability of specialists to participate in the 
trading process. Finally, the smaller depth added by the specialists and floor brokers is also 
consistent with the shift from floor to electronic limit orders that we have documented above. 
                                                                 
9 Similar results are obtained when defining the participation rate in terms of number of orders rather than number of 
shares. 
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3.2 Information and Prices 
Both Glosten (1999) and Baruch (2002) predict that improved transparency would lead to 
increased informational efficiency of prices. We implement two methodologies to test this 
hypothesis. The first test is based on the variance decomposition procedure from Hasbrouck 
(1993). Using information about transaction prices and trade size, Hasbrouck proposes a vector 
autoregression model to separate the efficient (random walk) price from deviations introduced by 
the trading process (e.g., short-term fluctuations in prices due to inventory control or order 
imbalances in the market). More specifically, the variance of log transaction prices, V(p), is 
decomposed into the variance of the efficient price and the variance of the deviations induced by 
the trading process, V(s). Because the expected value of the deviations is assumed by the 
procedure to be zero, the variance is a measure of their magnitude. 
To control for possible changes in the overall variability of prices around the event that can 
cause a change in the magnitude of the deviations, we divide V(s) by V(p) to normalize the 
measure. This ratio, VR(s/p), reflects the proportion of deviations from the efficient prices in the 
total variability of prices. If OpenBook allows traders to better time their trading activity to both 
take advantage of displayed liquidity and provide liquidity in periods of market stress, the 
proportion of deviations from the efficient price should be smaller after the event. Similarly, such 
an effect will take place if greater "commonality of information," as Glosten (1999) puts it, leads to 
faster adjustment to the efficient price with fewer orders executing during the adjustment process. 
The first line of Table 3 shows median changes between the pre- and post-event periods for 
VR(s/p) (where the ratio is expressed in percentage terms). While they are not significantly 
different from zero in the February and March post-event periods, they become negative and 
highly significant in the April and May post-event periods.  
Conceptually it is possible that even if the deviations of transaction prices from the 
efficient price remain the same, increased pre-trade transparency brings about faster revelation of 
information and therefore a quote-midpoint process that more closely follows the efficient price. A 
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more efficient quote-midpoint process would be closer to a random walk and therefore exhibit less 
autocorrelation (both positive and negative).  
The second and third lines of Table 3 show changes in the absolute value of the 30-minute 
and 60-minute first-order quote-midpoint return autocorrelation. For the 30-minute process, we 
divide the trading day into half-hour intervals and compute the returns from the prevailing quote 
midpoints at the beginning and end of each interval (a similar construction is used for the 60-
minute process). We examine the absolute value of the correlation coefficients because we would 
like to test how close the return process is to a random walk, which is characterized by zero 
autocorrelations.  
We find that the direction of changes in autocorrelation is consistent with more efficient 
prices, but the results are rather weak. While the median changes are negative in all post-event 
periods, only two of the numbers are statistically different from zero. One of the two statistically 
significant changes, however, is in the March post-event period that did not have a statistically 
significant change in VR(s/p). The results of these two tests together point to some improvement in 
informational efficiency under the new pre-trade transparency regime. 
The argument made by Glosten (1999) about the commonality of information can also be 
interpreted to mean that improved transparency would reduce the extent of the adverse selection 
problem. If this is indeed the case, we should observe that trades cause smaller permanent price 
changes. To test this hypothesis we use the variance decomposition procedure developed in 
Hasbrouck (1991). A vector autoregression of quote midpoint returns, a signed trade indicator 
variable, and log volume is used to identify both the efficient price variance, V(w), and the trade-
correlated component of the efficient price variance, V(x).10  
                                                                 
10 The trade indicator variable is identified using the quote midpoint rule. This rule assigns the value –1 to the trade 
indicator variable if the trade price is less than the prevailing quote midpoint, 0 if the trade price is equal to the 
midpoint, and +1 if the trade price is greater than the quote midpoint. The log volume variable is constructed by 
adding 1.00 to the number of shares in order to accommodate a change to the quotes without an intervening trade. 
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We use the ratio of the two (in percentage terms), VR(x/w), as a measure of the normalized 
trade-correlated component of the efficient price variance, or the fraction of the efficient price 
variance that is due to information in trades. The last line of Table 3 shows the cross-sectional 
medians of differences in VR(x/w) between the post- and pre-event periods. The results suggest a 
gradual decrease in VR(x/w), and the median is negative and statistically significant in the April 
and May post-event period. This evidence is consistent with a (weak) decrease in the extent of the 
adverse selection problem.  
Theoretical models such as Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), and Easley and 
O’Hara (1987) show how adverse selection hurts liquidity. The VR(x/w) results can therefore 
indicate a slight improvement in liquidity. On the other hand, the shorter duration and smaller size 
of limit orders reported in Section 3.1 may indicate worsened liquidity, but this is not necessarily 
so. Limit orders may be submitted more often, and limit order traders may seize opportunities to 
trade cheaply against temporary order imbalances that are created in the market. We therefore turn 
to a more explicit investigation of liquidity by examining both displayed trading interest in the 
book and execution costs.  
3.3 Liquidity 
What we would like to examine in this section is how the changing strategies of investors 
and specialists aggregate to create the new state of liquidity provision in the market. This analysis 
has special significance since the theoretical arguments surveyed in the introduction disagree on 
this point: Glosten (1999) and Baruch (2002) claim that greater transparency would improve 
liquidity; in contrast, Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2000) claim that it would cause liquidity to 
deteriorate. 
For each 5-minute snapshot of the limit-order book, we compare displayed liquidity in the 
book at several distances from the relevant side of the quote (the ask for limit sell orders and the 
bid for limit buy orders) to spot potential differences between liquidity that is closer to current 
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prices and away from the market. To better compare the liquidity of stocks with different share 
prices, we define the distance from the relevant side of the quote as a percentage of the stock’s 
price. We choose several cutoffs in dollar terms (5 cents, 25 cents, 1 dollar, and 5 dollars) and 
divide them by $30, the average share price in the pre-event period, to get the percentage bounds.11 
These bounds are then applied to each stock individually to create five categories of cumulative 
number of shares in the book between the relevant side of the quote and (i) 0.166% of the price, 
(ii) 0.833% of the price, (iii) 3.333% of the price, (iv) 16.667% of the price, and (v) the end of the 
book. 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the median change in cumulative depth in the book for each 
category. Out of the twenty numbers in the table (five categories, four post-event periods), only 
five are statistically significant at the 5% level. All of these numbers are positive. The rest of the 
numbers (positive and negative) are not statistically distinguishable from zero. This means that 
displayed liquidity changed relatively little, and the change we can detect is that liquidity increased 
(more depth is available in the book). This finding is consistent with the shift we document in 
Table 2 from using floor brokers to using electronic limit orders. 
But even if liquidity in the book improves, a decrease in specialist participation may cause 
execution costs of trades to increase. To judge "ex-post" liquidity, or how much is paid to execute 
trades, we examine changes in the effective spreads (defined as the distance between the 
transaction price and the prevailing quote midpoint). Panel B of Table 4 presents the effective 
spreads in dollar terms for the entire sample and for the four trading- intensity groups. It is 
interesting to note that there is an increase in effective spreads in February, but a decrease in the 
March, April, and May post-event periods (relative to the January pre-event period). A closer look 
shows that the significant increase in effective spreads in February is only for the most actively 
traded stocks. It is possible that predatory strategies (presumably more profitable in active stocks) 
                                                                 
11 The results are qualitatively similar when we use the dollar bounds. 
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initially cause liquidity to worsen. However, once investors adjust their trading strategies 
sufficiently, this reverses and liquidity improves.  
The table also shows a trend in improved liquidity. The magnitude of the median change in 
effective spreads increases from -0.143 cents in March to -0.330 in April and -0.454 in May. 
Overall, it seems that the permanent effect of the change in transparency is to improve liquidity for 
all stocks. We obtain similar results using percentage effective spreads and effective spreads 
computed separately for five trade-size categories. 
Since the theoretical models conflict on the issue of liquidity, and because there is much 
evidence that liquidity is affected by attributes that we do not test here (like volume), we also use 
several parametric approaches to examine the change in liquidity conditional on three control 
variables. The controls are the average daily dollar volume, intra-day volatility expressed as the 
average daily range of transaction prices (high minus low), and the average transaction price of the 
stock (to control for price level effects).  
The first econometric specification assumes that the liquidity measure for stock i in period 
t (where tÎ{pre, post}), Li,t, can be expressed as the sum of a stock-specific mean (mi), an event 
effect (a), a set of control variables, and an error term (h): 
Lit = mi + adt + b1AvgVol it + b2HiLow it + b3AvgPrc it + hit 
where dt is an indicator variable that takes the value zero in the pre-event period and one in the 
post-event period, AvgVol represents dollar volume, HiLow is intra-day volatility, and AvgPrc is 
the price.  By assuming that the errors are uncorrelated across securities and over the two periods 
(though we do not require them to be identically distributed), we can examine differences between 
the post- and pre-event periods and eliminate the firm specific mean: 
DLi = a + b1DAvgVol i + b2DHiLow i + b3DAvgPrc i + e i 
where D denotes a difference between the post- and pre-event periods.  
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We estimate the equation above using OLS and compute test statistics based on White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. The first line in Panel A of Table 5 presents the 
intercepts and p-values from the regressions using the change to total depth in the book (in round 
lots) as the liquidity variable. The intercepts for all four post-event periods are positive and two out 
of the four are statistically significant in the 5% level, indicating some increase in book depth in 
the post event period. The second line in Panel A presents the results using effective spreads (in 
cents) as the dependent variable. All coefficients are negative, and they increase in magnitude with 
time from –0.1046 in February to –0.8001 in May (where the last three post-event periods are 
statistically significant). It appears that after controlling for changes in volume, volatility, and price 
level, the unconditional result of an increase in effective spreads in February disappears, and we 
observe a stronger indication of an improvement in liquidity. 12 
Since the event happens to all stocks at the same time, it is possible that the error terms are 
correlated across stocks. This would cause the standard errors of the intercepts to be biased, but the 
OLS coefficients would still be consistent. To examine the robustness of our results to this 
potential problem we use two specifications. For the first specification, we compute daily values of 
                                                                 
12 Since effective spreads measure the cost of trading and volume measures the quantity of trading, it can be argued 
that a single-equation specification where volume is regressed on effective spreads suffers from an endogeneity 
problem. One way to overcome this potential problem is to run a simultaneous-equation model of spreads and volume. 
We ran the following model: 
DESpread¢i = a + b1DAvgVol i + b2DHiLow i + b3DAvgPrc i + b4DStdInv i + ei 
DAvgVoli = b5 + b6DESpread¢i  + b7DHiLow i + b8DAvgPrc i + b9DSysVol i + ni  
where DStdInv is the standard deviation of daily inventory closing positions of specialists (from the NYSE's SPETS 
file), and DSysVol is the systematic component of dollar volume. The systematic component is obtained from a market 
model of dollar volume using one year of daily data ending before the beginning of the pre-event period, with an 
equal-weighted portfolio of all common-domestic NYSE stocks as a proxy for the market (see Lo and Wang, 2001, 
and Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang, 2002, on the issue of a market model for volume). The simultaneous-
equation model was estimated both using two-stage least squares and three-stage least squares. For all post-event 
periods, the magnitudes of the intercepts from the effective spreads equation and their statistical significance were 
almost identical to those obtained using the single-equation specification reported in Table 5 (and are therefore omitted 
for brevity). 
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the variables (e.g., ten daily averages of effective spreads indexed by t rather than an average over 
the entire period) and estimate the following equation:  
Lit = Intercept + Skn= 1 (bk Ditk )  + ?1 Volit + ?2 HLit  +  ?3 Prcit + eit 
where the dummy variables Ditk (k=1, …, n) take the value one for the k-th day in the n-day post-
event period and zero otherwise, Vol is the daily dollar volume, HL is the daily range of transaction 
prices, and Prc is the daily average transaction price of the stock. We estimate the model in two 
ways: (i) for the pre-event period combined with each of the post-event periods (resulting in 10 
coefficients of the daily post-event dummy variables), and (ii) pooling together all 50 pre-event 
and post-event days (resulting in 40 coefficients of the daily post-event dummy variables).  
Panel B of Table 5 reports the median of the coefficients on the post-event dummy 
variables and the p-value (in parentheses) of a Wilcoxon signed rank test against the hypothesis of 
a zero median. Three out of the four post-event periods show a significant increase in book depth 
after the introduction of OpenBook, and so does the pooled regression over all periods. Similarly, 
there is a highly significant decrease in effective spreads in three out of the four post-event periods, 
and the same goes for the pooled regression.  
The second specification that attempts to overcome the potential problem of cross-
correlated errors relies on computing cross-sectional daily averages of each variable and using 
OLS to estimate the following time-series model: 
 CSLt = Intercept +S k4= 1 (bk Dk )  + ?1 CSVolt +  ?2 CSHLt  +  ?3 CSPrct + et 
where the dummy variables Dk (k=1, 2, 3, 4) take the value of one for the k-th post-event period 
and zero otherwise, CSVol is the cross-sectional average of daily dollar volume, CSHL is the cross-
sectional average of intra-day volatility, and CSPrc is the daily mean transaction price averaged 
across stocks.  
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In Panel C of table 5 we report the coefficients of the dummy variables for the four post-
event periods and their associated p-values calculated using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. All four coefficients are positive and statistically significant in the depth 
regression, and two out of the four are negative and significant in the effective spreads regression. 
The fact that the results are qualitatively similar using all the econometric specifications above 
indicates that our findings are rather robust. We conclude that both “ex-ante” liquidity (displayed 
trading interest in the book) and “ex-post” liquidity (effective spreads) increase following the 
introduction of OpenBook.13 
3.4 Price Effects of Changes in Pre-trade Transparency 
It is usually difficult to examine the welfare effects of changes in regulation or the structure 
of markets. We do not claim that our analysis will be able to come up with unequivocal statements 
about the optimality of the change in pre-trade transparency. Rather, we will provide some 
evidence about one aspect of welfare: the impact of OpenBook on the wealth of investors.  
It has long been claimed that liquidity affects required returns (e.g., Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986). The argument usually made is that investors require higher expected returns to 
compensate them for higher execution costs. If liquidity improves following the introduction of 
OpenBook, prices of stocks should increase to reflect the lower future expected returns that 
investors will require of the stocks. An increase in prices due to a more efficient market 
mechanism makes investors better off, and this is the welfare aspect we examine here.   
                                                                 
13 Note that both displayed liquidity and effective spreads provide information about the potential or actual execution 
costs for individual trades. As part of the trading strategy of an investor, an order may be broken down and traded over 
the course of a day to achieve better execution. Large intra-day fluctuations in prices may decrease the ex-ante 
willingness of institutions to hold large positions in the stock (due to potential difficulties in obtaining and liquidating 
a position), which may have a detrimental effect on liquidity. On the other hand, intra-day volatility may also work to 
the benefit of traders by making limit orders more profitable as they benefit from increased transitory volatility. The 
median post-event changes in intra-day volatility (HiLow) are $0.035, $0.0275, $0.033, and $0.039 for February, 
March, April, and May, respectively. All of them are statistically different from zero. On a pre-event value of $0.6035, 
this increase in intra-day volatility seems to be modest. 
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We study the changes in prices around the introduction of OpenBook using standard event-
study methodology. We compute a Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) measure by summing 
daily abnormal returns from January 24 (the introduction of OpenBook) to the end of each post-
event period. The daily abnormal returns are the residuals of a market model using all trading days 
in 2001 with the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index as a proxy for the market.14 
Panel A of Table 6 shows the cross-sectional median CAR and the p-value for a Wilcoxon 
test against the hypothesis of a zero median. The medians reported for all periods are positive and 
highly statistically significant. The magnitudes of the medians, ranging from 1.68% in February to 
8.4% in April, seem to be rather substantial from an economic standpoint. 
While we attribute the increase in prices to the event, one always wonders whether 
eliminating the systematic component measured relative to a market proxy is sufficient to warrant 
such a conclusion. A priori, we do have a reason to expect increased prices, as we have shown in 
Section 3.3 that liquidity improves. Next we examine the relationship between effective spreads 
and cumulative abnormal returns to see if indeed a decrease in effective spreads is likely to show 
up as higher CAR.  We estimate the following cross-sectional relation between changes in relative 
effective spreads between the pre- and post-event periods and cumulative abnormal returns from 
the beginning of the pre-event period to the end of each post-event period: 
CARi = a + bDESpreadi + e i 
If b  is negative and significant, stocks that experience greater changes in effective spreads around 
the event also exhibit greater changes in prices in the appropriate direction.  
                                                                 
14 We have also used January 2, 2000 to November 30, 2001 as the interval over which to estimate the market model to 
exclude the period after December 7, 2001 (the date when the SEC approved the NYSE petition). Conceptually, the 
changes in liquidity might have been anticipated after the approval of OpenBook on December 7, but it is hard to 
imagine a significant effect since there was no consensus on how, if at all, liquidity would change as a result of the 
change in pre-trade transparency. Whatever the case may be, any adjustment of prices between December 7, 2001 and 
January 24, 2002 would bias us against finding a significant CAR following the introduction of OpenBook. 
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Panel B of Table 6 presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regressions for each of 
the post-event periods. We present the results for each trading- intensity group separately because 
the magnitude of the slope coefficients seems to be rather different for the four groups. It is clear 
from the table that the negative relation between changes in effective spreads and cumulative 
abnormal returns holds around the event. All 16 slope coefficients (four groups, four post-event 
periods) are negative and statistically different from zero. The coefficients are monotonically 
decreasing across trading- intensity groups. We believe that this is due to the systematic difference 
in magnitudes of the effective spreads of the groups (as evident in Table 1). These negative and 
significant slope coefficients provide some confidence in the existence of a relationship between 
effective spreads and CAR that could generate the positive abnormal returns we document 
following the introduction of OpenBook.15 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The structure of securities markets in the U.S. and around the world is undergoing many 
changes. Various competing market structures were introduced into U.S. equity trading by 
Alternative Trading Systems, and the SEC has been instrumental in providing the conditions that 
helped these new trading platforms to flourish. In particular, the SEC has been pushing for greater 
pre-trade transparency mandating certain display requirements for limit orders (affecting both 
market makers and Alternative Trading Systems organized as electronic limit order books). The 
insistence of the SEC on pre-trade transparency stems from its conviction that transparency 
improves not just price discovery, but also the fairness, competitiveness, and attractiveness of U.S. 
markets.  
                                                                 
15 Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver (2000) estimate a similar relation between returns and effective spreads except that 
they use buy-and-hold returns rather than cumulative abnormal returns (i.e., they do not eliminate the systematic 
component). They also document a significant negative cross-sectional relation between changes in effective spreads 
and returns in their sample. 
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So far, however, there has not been a consensus in the academic literature on whether 
greater pre-trade transparency in the sense of disclosing more information about limit orders in the 
book is beneficial to the market. As previously mentioned, the theoretical model in Madhavan, 
Porter, and Weaver (2000) implies that greater pre-trade transparency harms liquidity, and they 
find support for this claim when investigating an increase in pre-trade transparency implemented 
by the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1990. Against this context, the results presented in this paper 
have important implications in that they provide empirical support, for the first time, to the view 
that improved pre-trade transparency of a limit order book is beneficial. Our focus on the largest 
market in the world and the quality of the order-level data we use make our findings even more 
significant in the debate among academics and policy makers.  
We find that investors do change their strategies in response to the change in market 
design: they submit smaller limit orders and cancel limit orders in the book faster and more often. 
These findings are consistent with a more active management of trading strategies in the face of 
greater risk of order exposure. Additionally, we find that traders shift activity away from floor 
brokers toward electronically submitted limit orders. This may indicate that OpenBook enables 
traders to implement more complex strategies themselves, and therefore reduces their need to 
delegate that responsibility to floor brokers. We also find that NYSE specialists change their 
behavior in that they trade less and, together with floor brokers, add less depth to the quote. These 
changes can reflect the increased risk in proprietary trading without the help of privileged 
information about the book, a crowding out effect that results from increased competition provided 
by active limit order trading, and a shift in investor strategies from using floor brokers to limit 
orders submitted electronically via SuperDot. 
The equilibrium effects on the state of the market, both in terms of liquidity and 
informational efficiency, seem to suggest that increased transparency is a "win-win" situation. We 
find some improvement in informational efficiency following the event, consistent with the view 
that greater pre-trade transparency is beneficial for the price discovery process. Displayed liquidity 
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in the book increases and execution costs decline. Beyond providing support to current SEC beliefs 
about the importance of transparency for the quality of U.S. markets, our paper provides evidence 
that market structure has implications for the welfare of investors. This natural experiment in 
market design shows how providing additional information to investors can help them manage 
their trading needs, and our analysis suggests that the improvement in liquidity resulted in higher 
stock prices.  
The introduction of OpenBook provides hope that even markets that are considered highly 
liquid and active, such as the NYSE, can improve by changing features of market design to meet 
investor and regulator demands. NYSE material stresses that OpenBook was designed to increase 
transparency in a decimal trading environment. Because the idea of publicly distributing 
information about the book has been around for many years, the implementation at this point in 
time indeed seems to have been in response to the change in the tick size. In a sense, one 
regulatory change in market design (the decreased tick size) caused the NYSE to implement 
another change in market design (improved pre-trade transparency).  
The current securities trading environment is characterized by both frequent regulatory 
interventions and competitive pressures. The experience with OpenBook suggests that markets can 
and should respond to changes in their environment by modifying the design of their trading 
systems to better cater to investor needs. 
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Table 1 
Sample Summary Statistics  
 
The universe of stocks for the study consists of all domestic common stocks listed on the NYSE, excluding firms with multiple classes of shares traded, closed-
end funds, and investment trusts. We sort the stocks according to median dollar volume in the last quarter of 2001 and divide the universe into four quartiles. 
From each quartile we choose a stratified sample of 100 stocks, creating a final sample of 400 stocks. The table presents summary statistics for the five periods 
used in the study: the pre-event period (January 7–18) and the four post-event periods: February 4–15, March 4–15, April 1–12, and May 6–17. From the TAQ 
database, AvgVol is the average daily number of shares traded; QSpread is the average quoted spread calculated in dollar terms and in percentage terms (the bid-
ask spread divided by the quote midpoint); QDepth is the average total quoted depth (sum of the depths on the bid and ask sides) measured in dollars and in 
number of shares; ESpread is the average effective spread (the transaction price minus the midquote) in dollars and percentage terms (scaled by the quote 
midpoint); and AvgPrc is the average transaction price of the stock.  
 
  AvgVol 
(in million $) 
AvgVol 
(in 100s) 
QSpread 
(in cents) 
QSpread 
(in %) 
QDepth 
(in $1000) 
QDepth 
(in 100s) 
ESpread 
(in cents) 
ESpread 
(in %) 
AvgPrc 
(in $) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median     Mean   Median Mean Median Mean Median   Mean Median Mean Median 
 
Entire 
 
Jan.  31.70    5.69 8,498.44 2,372.30 7.6    6.2 0.439 0.250 77.69 60.04 30.62 23.34 5.0    4.0 0.296    0.156 30.25 25.49 
Sample Feb.  31.59    5.89 9,419.32 2,131.70 7.5    6.3 0.458 0.254 76.60 58.76 31.38 23.90 5.0    4.3 0.313    0.160 29.77 24.87 
 Mar.  35.16    6.68 9,305.33 2,505.20 7.1    6.0 0.406 0.228 76.35 57.87 29.37 22.11 4.8    3.9 0.270    0.145 31.64 26.37 
 Apr.  30.43    6.11 7,675.17 2,254.15 6.8    5.7 0.378 0.207 70.91 53.84 26.44 20.35 4.5    3.7 0.248    0.133 32.14 27.04 
  May  30.53    5.78 8,225.61 2,290.75 6.6    5.6 0.372 0.194 73.29 53.80 26.91 20.31 4.4    3.6 0.239    0.126 32.31 27.81 
Group 1 Jan. 109.80  59.43 26,433.18 14,941.40 4.9    4.4 0.119 0.108 159.94 131.84 40.56 34.45 3.2    3.0 0.079    0.070 45.86 42.74 
(most Feb. 108.78  60.61 29,888.36 14,868.15 5.1    4.6 0.130 0.115 152.89 124.74 41.45 29.80 3.4    3.1 0.087    0.077 44.94 41.25 
active  Mar. 120.85   67.28 29,056.45 17,172.45 4.7    4.3 0.114 0.098 156.88 130.14 39.90 33.13 3.2    2.9 0.077    0.066 47.73 43.19 
stocks) Apr. 104.20  57.70 23,608.54 13,764.15 4.4    3.9 0.106 0.090 143.92 123.43 36.86 28.14 2.9    2.6 0.070    0.059 47.82 43.91 
 May 102.63  60.53 24,815.17 17,110.85 4.3    4.0 0.109 0.092 153.54 130.90 40.61 29.49 2.9    2.6 0.073    0.062 47.13 42.23 
Group 2 Jan.   13.25  11.03 5,345.64 3,443.70 6.0    5.6 0.208 0.192 77.85 70.19 28.55 24.37 3.8    3.5 0.133    0.121 32.08 31.21 
 Feb.   13.80  11.98 5,523.12 3,954.65 5.9    5.7 0.214 0.190 78.09 77.67 30.18 23.31 3.8    3.6 0.138    0.122 31.94 31.39 
 Mar.   15.18  13.12 5,498.91 4,198.90 5.7    5.3 0.191 0.169 76.02 70.95 27.07 22.94 3.7    3.4 0.125    0.109 33.87 33.64 
 Apr.   13.14  12.10 4,604.03 3,705.15 5.2    4.9 0.175 0.167 70.77 68.94 24.24 20.48 3.3    3.1 0.111    0.105 34.12 32.80 
 May   14.72  11.24 5,440.99 3,549.60 5.0    4.8 0.173 0.145 70.48 69.80 24.52 20.62 3.2    3.1 0.112    0.094 34.45 33.51 
Group 3 Jan.     3.26    2.72 1,638.28 1,217.05 9.3    7.0 0.355 0.300 49.08 42.68 23.87 18.65 5.9    4.5 0.229    0.194 28.25 23.61 
 Feb.     3.18    2.36 1,614.53 1,165.90 8.8    7.3 0.372 0.306 52.47 44.86 26.89 19.61 5.9    4.6 0.242    0.195 27.61 23.13 
 Mar.     3.91    3.19 1,937.55 1,333.00 8.6    6.6 0.324 0.270 48.35 44.98 22.51 17.42 5.7    4.4 0.208    0.175 29.37 24.81 
 Apr.     3.70    2.84 1,743.91 1,078.30 8.4    6.4 0.302 0.249 45.86 43.16 19.95 15.81 5.5    4.2 0.195    0.156 30.33 25.03 
 May     3.78    2.92 1,646.25 1,212.00 8.2    6.2 0.296 0.236 44.95 39.08 19.51 15.00 5.5    3.9 0.189    0.153 30.70 25.78 
Group 4 Jan.     0.48    0.37 576.64 326.60 10.3    8.9 1.076 0.833 23.90 19.08 29.49 16.07 7.2    6.3 0.744    0.568 14.82 11.15 
(least Feb.     0.59    0.43 651.26 361.60 10.0    9.5 1.118 0.849 22.94 19.78 27.01 17.10 7.1    6.4 0.786    0.589 14.59 10.89 
active  Mar.     0.72    0.54 728.39 445.45 9.6    8.8 0.995 0.751 24.15 20.84 28.00 14.53 6.6    5.9 0.669    0.508 15.57 11.18 
stocks) Apr.     0.69    0.58 744.21 432.65 9.4    8.9 0.930 0.689 23.09 19.65 24.70 14.02 6.5    6.1 0.617    0.459 16.30 12.51 
 May     1.00    0.61 1,000.03 394.40 8.8    8.2 0.909 0.591 24.19 19.57 23.00 14.19 5.9    5.2 0.582    0.382 16.94 13.07 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Trading Strategies 
 
This table presents the analysis of changes in trading strategies of investors and specialists following the introduction of OpenBook. The pre-event period is 
January 7–18 (Jan) and the post-event periods are February 4–15 (Feb), March 4–15 (Mar), April 1–12 (Apr), and May 6–17 (May) (each contains 10 trading 
days). In Panel A, DCancRate is the change in cancellation rate defined as the ratio of the number of cancelled limit orders over the number of limit orders 
submitted, and DTimeCanc is the change in the number of seconds between submission and cancellation of limit orders. Panel B presents the results of the 
duration analysis of time -to-cancellation. For each stock in the sample, we use a parametric approach assuming a Weibull distribution for time-to-cancellation 
(T):  
Log Tit = ai + ßi Iit + ?i Distance from quoteit + eit 
and a nonparametric analysis applying the Cox (1972) model of the hazard rate (h(t)) : 
Log hit(t) = a i(t) + ß i Iit + ?i Distance from quoteit + eit 
In both models, I is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for post-event observations and 0 for pre -event observations. Distance from the relevant quote 
sides (i.e., bid for sells and ask for buys), standardized by the quote midpoint, is used as a covariate. Panel B reports the median of ßis (the coefficients on the 
dummy variables estimated separately for each stock), the number of ßis significant at the 5% level, and the p-value (in parentheses) of a Wilcoxon signed rank 
test against the hypothesis of a zero median. In Panel C, DLimitSize is the change in the average size of limit orders between the pre- and post-event periods in 
shares; and DFloor/Lmt is the change in the ratio of the number of shares executed by floor brokers to the number of shares executed using limit orders in the 
book. Panel D demonstrates the changes in specialist behavior. DSpecRate measures changes in the specialists’ participation rate in terms of number of shares, 
and DSpecDepth is the change in the specialists’ total commitment (in dollars) on the bid and ask sides of the quoted depth. For all variables, the table reports the 
median and the p-value (in parentheses) of a Wilcoxon signed rank test against the hypothesis of a zero median. "**" indicates significance at the 1% level and 
"*" indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Cancellation of Limit Orders 
 
 
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan  
 
 
Variables  
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
DCancRate 0.0068 (0.1009) 0.0259** (0.0000) 0.0466** (0.0000) 0.0475** (0.0000) 
 
DTimeCanc -12.765* (0.0190) -25.095** (0.0000) -39.902** (0.0000) -50.584** (0.0000) 
 
 
Panel B: Duration Analysis  
 
 
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan  
 
 
ß 
 
 
Median 
 
# of 
significant 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
Median 
 
# of 
significant 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
Median 
 
# of 
significant 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
Median 
 
# of 
significant 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
Weibull -0.1106** 394 (0.0000) -0.1621** 393 (0.0000) -0.2529** 398 (0.0000) -0.2782** 398 (0.0000) 
Cox 0.0636** 397 (0.0000)  0.1007** 398 (0.0000) 0.1570** 397 (0.0000) 0.1590** 399 (0.0000) 
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Panel C: Differences in Trading Strategies of Investors between Post- and Pre-event Periods 
 
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan   
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
DLimitSize     -29.513** (0.0003) -31.515** (0.0000) -55.763** (0.0000) -68.423** (0.0000) 
DFloor/Lmt  -0.0135 (0.2100) -0.0323** (0.0022) -0.0438** (0.0001) -0.0495** (0.0000) 
 
Panel D: Differences in NYSE Specialists' Behavior between Post- and Pre-event Periods 
 
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan   
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
DSpecRate  0.0003 (0.5876)     -0.0069** (0.0001)   -0.0050** (0.0019)   -0.0088** (0.0000) 
 
DSpecDepth -1164.76* (0.0200)     -1320.08 (0.1300) -2972.83** (0.0000) -2599.81** (0.0000) 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Informational Effects 
 
This table presents an analysis of information and prices around the introduction of OpenBook. The pre-event period is January 7–18 (Jan) and the post-event 
periods are February 4–15 (Feb), March 4–15 (Mar), April 1–12 (Apr), and May 6–17 (May) (each contains 10 trading days). We use two types of tests to 
examine changes in the informational efficiency of prices. The first test uses a variable constructed from the variance decomposition procedure in Hasbrouck 
(1993). DVR (s/p) is the change in the ratio (in percentage terms) of the variance of the discrepancies between log transaction prices and the efficient (random 
walk) price divided by the variance of log transaction prices (to normalize the measure). The second test looks at the change in the absolute value of first-order 
autocorrelations of midquote returns. We divide the trading day into 30-minute intervals for D | Corr30 | and 60-minute intervals for D | Corr60 | and compute the 
returns from prevailing midquotes at the beginning and end of each interval. We also examine the change in the relative measure of trade informativeness 
developed in Hasbrouck (1991). DVR (x/w) is the change in the ratio (in percentage terms) of the trade-correlated component to the total efficient price variance. 
For all variables, the table reports the median and the p-value (in parentheses) of a Wilcoxon signed rank test against the hypothesis of a zero median. "**" 
indicates significance at the 1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan  
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
DVR (s/p) -0.00047 (0.5294) 0.00043 (0.4390) -0.00567** (0.0000) -0.00691** (0.0000) 
 
D | Corr30 | -0.00343 (0.5868) -0.01181* (0.0384) -0.00355 (0.5384) -0.00100 (0.7996) 
 
D | Corr60 | -0.00370 (0.2498) -0.00590 (0.1393) -0.01424 (0.0906) -0.01749* (0.0251) 
 
DVR (x/w) 0.25800 (0.2399) -0.84400 (0.0864) -0.66600* (0.0325) -0.66550* (0.0432) 
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Table 4 
Unconditional Analysis of Liquidity 
 
This table presents the analysis of changes to both displayed and "ex-post" liquidity following the introduction of OpenBook. The pre-event period is January 7–
18 (Jan) and the post-event periods are February 4–15 (Feb), March 4–15 (Mar), April 1–12 (Apr), and May 6–17 (May) (each contains 10 trading days). Panel A 
presents DCumShares, the change to cumulative number of shares in the book at several distances from the relevant quote sides (i.e., ask for sells and bid for 
buys), where the distances are defined in terms of percentage of the stock's price (0.166%, 0.833%, 3.333%, 16.667%, and the entire book). The percentage 
bounds are determined by deciding on dollar bounds (5 cents, 25 cents, 1 dollar, and 5 dollars) and then dividing them by the average share price in the pre-event 
period for the sample ($30). Panel B shows DESpread¢, the change in effective spreads in cents both for the entire sample and for four groups based on trading 
intensity in the last quarter of 2001. For all variables, the table reports the median and the p-value (in parentheses) of a Wilcoxon signed rank test against the 
hypothesis of a zero median. "**" indicates significance at the 1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
 
Panel A: Differences in Cumulative Number of Shares Displayed in the Book between Post- and Pre-event Periods 
  
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan  
 
 
DCumShares  
 
 
 Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
 Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
 Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
 Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
0.166% from midpoint      -1.30 (0.7981)   97.78 (0.1273)  -128.43 ( 0.4355)  -124.64 ( 0.0623) 
0.833% from midpoint   -216.74 (0.4294)  381.35* (0.0389)  -136.96 ( 0.3909)  -124.62 ( 0.2272) 
3.333% from midpoint   -193.64 (0.7245)  1072.80** (0.0050)  -130.44 ( 0.8803) -309.11 ( 0.6914) 
16.67% from midpoint     127.26 (0.5025) 2081.44** (0.0044)  1059.48* ( 0.0293)  485.07 ( 0.3272) 
Entire Book   1818.60* (0.0275)  887.52 (0.1304)  366.11 ( 0.5364) -838.74 ( 0.8916) 
         
 
Panel B: Differences in Effective Spreads (in cents) between Post- and Pre-event Periods 
 
 
 
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan  
 
 
DESpread¢ 
 
 
 Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
 Median 
 
 (p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
 Median 
 
 (p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
 
 Median 
 
 (p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
Entire Sample      0.087* (0.0382) -0.143** (0.0000) -0.330** (0.0000) -0.454** (0.0000) 
Group 1 (most active stocks)  0.192** (0.0000)     -0.082* (0.0202) -0.325** (0.0000) -0.272** (0.0000) 
Group 2    0.047 (0.6096)    -0.082 (0.2675) -0.331** (0.0000) -0.478** (0.0000) 
Group 3    0.055 (0.9192)     -0.282* (0.0118) -0.361** (0.0000) -0.635** (0.0000) 
Group 4 (least active stocks)    0.030 (0.7478)     -0.321* (0.0100) -0.297** (0.0034) -0.772** (0.0000) 
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Table 5 
Conditional Analysis of Liquidity 
 
This table presents results of analyses of liquidity changes around the introduction of OpenBook controlling for changes in volume, volatility, and price level. 
The pre-event period is January 7–18 (Jan) and the post-event periods are February 4–15 (Feb), March 4–15 (Mar), April 1–12 (Apr), and May 6–17 (May) (each 
contains 10 trading days). We use two liquidity measures: (i) DDepth is the change to the total depth in the book in round lots, and (ii) DESpread¢ is the change in 
effective spreads in cents. In Panel A, we report the results of OLS regressions of changes in the liquidity measures on changes in the control variables: 
DLi = a + ß1 DAvgVoli + ß2 DHiLowi + ß3 DAvgPrci + ei 
where DAvgVol is the difference in average daily dollar volume, DHiLow is the difference in intra-day volatility (average daily range of transaction prices), and 
DAvgPrc is the difference in the average transaction price of the stock. All differences are between the post- and pre-event periods. We run the regressions 
separately for each post-event period. We report the intercepts from the eight regressions and their associated p-values calculated using White's 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. For the analysis in Panel B we use daily data to estimate (OLS) the following relation: 
Lit = Intercept + Sk
n
= 1 ( ßk Ditk ) + ?1 Volit + ?2 HLit  +  ?3 Prcit + eit 
where dummy variable Ditk (k  = 1, …, n) takes the value of one for the k-th day in the n-day post-event period and zero otherwise, Vol is the average daily dollar 
volume, HL is the daily price range, and Prc is the daily average transaction price of the stock. We estimate the model for each post-event period separately and 
for a pooled 40-day post-event period. We report the median of the dummy variables’ coefficients (ßks) and the p-value (in parentheses) of a Wilcoxon signed 
rank test against the hypothesis of a zero median. For the analysis in Panel C we estimate (OLS) the following relation using cross-sectional averages at daily 
frequency: 
 
 CSLt = Intercept +Sk
4
= 1 ( ßk Dkt ) + ?1 CSVolt +  ?2 CSHLt  +  ?3 CSPrct + et 
where dummy variable Dkt (k  = 1, 2, 3, 4) takes the value of one for the k-th post-event period and zero otherwise, CSVol is the cross-sectional average of daily 
dollar volume, CSHL is the cross-sectional average of intra-day volatility, and CSPrc is the daily mean transaction price averaged across stocks. We report the 
coefficients (ß1-4) of the dummy variables and their associated p-values calculated using White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. For all parameters, 
"**" indicates significance at the 1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
 
Panel A: Differences in Liquidity Variables in a Cross-Sectional Multivariate Regression (400 Observations) 
 
Feb-Jan 
 
Mar-Jan  
 
Apr-Jan  
 
May-Jan   
 
 
Variables 
 
 
a 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
 
a 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
 
a 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
 
a 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
DDepth  4586.35 (0.1398) 10734.64* (0.0299) 11713.03* (0.0298)  9006.07 (0.1347) 
 
DESpread¢    -0.1046 (0.1848)  -0.2817** (0.0066)  -0.6257** (0.0000) -0.8001** (0.0000) 
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Panel B: Analysis of Liquidity Changes Estimated from Multivariate Regressions at the Daily Frequency 
  
Feb (8000 Obs.) 
 
Mar  (8000 Obs.) 
 
Apr (8000 Obs.) 
 
May (8000 Obs.)  
 
All Periods (20000 Obs.) 
Variables 
 
Median ß 
(n=10) 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
Median ß 
(n=10) 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
Median ß 
(n=10) 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
Median ß 
(n=10) 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
Median ß 
(n=40) 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon 
test) 
 
Depth 1404.45* (0.0249) 317.71 (0.6103) 1198.40* (0.0144) 1569.02** (0.0080) 1211.95** (0.0000) 
 
ESpread¢  -0.0087 (0.9188) -0.4048** (0.0059) -0.8600** (0.0059)   -1.1311** (0.0059) -0.6562** (0.0000) 
           
 
 
Panel C: Time -Series Analysis of Liquidity Changes Estimated from a Multivariate Regression using Cross-sectional Averages (50 Observations) 
 
Feb 
 
Mar  
 
Apr  
 
May   
 
 
Variables 
 
 
ß1 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
 
ß2 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
 
ß3 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
 
ß4 
 
(p-value of  
t-statistic) 
 
Depth 770.01** (0.0004) 827.09** (0.0002) 740.76** (0.0012) 618.16** (0.0013) 
 
ESpread¢  0.0790 (0.1819)  -0.1087 (0.2081) -0.3325** (0.0000) -0.4381** (0.0000) 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
 
This table presents an analysis of the price effects of changes in liquidity around the introduction of OpenBook. The pre -event period is January 7–18 (Jan) and 
the post-event periods are February 4–15 (Feb), March 4–15 (Mar), April 1–12 (Apr), and May 6–17 (May) (each contains 10 trading days). We compute daily 
abnormal returns as residuals of a market model using one year of daily returns ending on November 30, 2001 with the Standard and Poor's 500 Index as a proxy 
for the market. We construct a Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) measure by summing the daily abnormal returns up to the end of each post-event period. In 
Panel A, we report the median CAR between the implementation date (January 24, 2002) and the end of each post-event period and the p-value (in parentheses) 
of a Wilcoxon signed rank test against the hypothesis of a zero median. In Panel B, we report the results of OLS regressions of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
between the beginning of the pre-event period and the end of each post-event period on changes in relative effective spreads (DESpread): 
  CARi = a + ß ?ESpreadi + ei 
We run the regressions separately for each of the four 100-stock trading intensity groups (based on median dollar volume in the last quarter of 2001) and for each 
post-event period. "**" indicates significance at the 1% level and "*" indicates significance at the 5% level (both against a two-sided alternative). 
 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
 
Feb 
 
Mar 
 
Apr 
 
May 
 
 
 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
 
Median 
 
(p-value of 
Wilcoxon test) 
 
CAR 0.0168** (0.0059) 0.0414** (0.0000) 0.0840** (0.0000) 0.0741** (0.0000) 
 
 
Panel B: Analysis of the Effect of Liquidity Changes on CAR 
 
Feb  
 
Mar  
 
Apr  
 
May  
 
 
 
a  
(p-value) 
 
b 
 (p-value) 
 
Adj R2 
 (in %) 
 
a  
(p-value) 
 
b 
 (p-value) 
 
Adj R2 
 (in %) 
 
a  
(p-value) 
 
b 
 (p-value) 
 
Adj R2 
 (in %) 
 
a  
(p-value) 
 
b 
 (p-value) 
 
Adj R2 
 (in %) 
 
Group 1 (most 0.033** -4.731** 50.68 -0.001 -3.322** 31.26    -0.017 -3.962** 22.75 -0.021 -4.545** 36.08 
active stocks) (0.004) (0.000)  (0.926) (0.000)  (0.305) (0.000)  (0.221) (0.000)  
 
Group 2  -0.003 -2.619** 32.90 -0.015 -2.061** 15.53 0.013 -1.344* 4.27 -0.036 -2.489** 16.84 
 (0.770) (0.000)  (0.290) (0.000)  (0.520) (0.022)  (0.127) (0.000)  
 
Group 3 -0.014 -0.374* 3.49   0.001 -0.647* 5.04 0.022 -1.245** 14.69 -0.029 -1.247** 14.61 
 (0.172) (0.035)  (0.940) (0.014)  (0.293) (0.000)  (0.243) (0.000)  
 
Group 4 (least  0.002 -0.219** 14.80 -0.005 -0.419** 35.72 0.037 -0.501** 38.56 -0.036 -0.618** 46.15 
active stocks) (0.910) (0.000)  (0.807) (0.000)  (0.090) (0.000)  (0.195) (0.000)  
             
 
